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Maher argues that the decision in Farrell is analogous to this case because the 
employee in Farrell was also injured in an office. The Third Circuit distinguished this 
case from Farrell because unlike the employee in Farrell, Respondent actually left the 
office, whereas the employee in Farrell did not engage in activity in the pier or yard, and 
he did not act as a checker on the dock. 
Respondent cited Levins v. Benefits Review Board, 724 F.2d 4, 7 ( l  st Cir. 1 984) 
where the court looked at the "actual nature of the employee's regularly assigned duties 
as a whole" emphasizing the need to examine the totality of employee's job. Respondent 
also cited Caputo where coverage was granted to workers that spend "at least some of 
their time in indisputably longshoring operations." Caputo, 432 U.S. at 2 73 .  The Third 
Circuit also considered the approach followed by other courts, where coverage was 
granted to an employee who spent anywhere from two and a half to five percent of his 
time performing longshore activities. Boudloche v. Howard Trucking Co. ,  632 F.2d 1 346 
(5th Cir. 1 980). 
The Third Circuit found that respondent's employment was similar to that of the 
employees in Levins and Boudloche because he spent 50% of his time employed in a 
position covered by the act. The Third Circuit concluded the proper analysis would be to 
use the test in Levins requiring the court to look at the "regular portion of the overall 
tasks to which the claimant could have been assigned as a matter of course" (Levins, 724 
F.2d at 9), in conjunction with the rule from Caputo, to assess whether the employee 
works 'at least some of the time in indisputably longshoring operations." Caputo, 432 
U S. at 273.  The Third Circuit held that respondent was in fact covered under the Act 
due to the amount of time spent working as a checker in addition to his overall duties 
including the subjection to assignment as a checker even though at the time of the injury 
respondent was not working in his capacity in a maritime employee. 
Monica A. Brescia 
Class of 2005 
PROPORTIONATE SHARE APPROACH DISALLOWS 
CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS 
A defendant in an admiralty tort action who settles with the plaintiff cannot bring a 
contribution sui t against a non-settling defendant who has not been released from 
liability to the plaintiff by the settlement agreement. 
Murphy v. Fla. Keys Elec. Coop. Ass'n 
United States Court of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit 
329 F.3d 1 3 1 1 
(Decided May 9, 2003) 
Shortly after midnight on July 25, 2000, Raymond Ashman IV ("Raymond") and 
his two friends Brendan and Steven Murphy went out in a boat owned by Raymond's 
father to take advantage of the start of annual lobster mini-season. The voyage came to an 
abrupt end. The boat, piloted by Raymond, crashed into an "electric pole abutment 
support structure" owned by defendant, Florida Keys Electric Co-op Association, Inc. 
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("Florida Keys"). As a result, Brendan Murphy was killed while both Steven Murphy 
and Raymond were injured. 
The parents of Brendan and Steven ("Murphys") brought a wrongful death suit 
against Florida Keys in federal district court under admiralty jurisdiction. No suit was 
brought against the Ashmans. Florida Keys also invoked the federal court's admiralty 
jurisdiction in filing a third-party complaint against the Ashmans, claiming that it was 
entitled to contribution from the Ashmans for liability it incurred to the Murphys. In 
response, the Ashmans filed a counterclaim against Florida Keys for their son's injuries 
as a civil action under the supplemental jurisdiction of the district court. Later, the 
Ashmans filed a suit against Florida Keys to recover for their son's injuries in state court. 
While all of the actions were pending, Florida Keys settled its wrongful death suit 
with the Murphys. However, the terms of the settlement agreement failed to include a 
provision releasing the Ashmans from liability against claims brought by the Murphys. 
As a result, the Ashmans moved for summary judgment on Florida Keys' third party 
contribution claim. The Ashmans argued that since Florida Keys' failed to included a 
condition in the settlement agreement releasing them from liability, Flordia Keys could 
no longer maintain a contribution claim against them. The district court agreed, granting 
the Ashmans' motion for summary judgment on the third party contribution claim 
brought by Florida Keys and dismissed without prejudice the Ashman's counterclaim 
against Florida Keys. 
Following this decision, Florida Keys appealed the summary judgment granted 
against its contribution claim and the dismissal without prejudice of the Ashman's  
counterclaim. Regarding the summary judgment, Florida Keys argued that the Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 957 F.2d 1 575 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 992) 
decision should be followed, whereby the pro tanto approach enables a settling defendant 
to sue a non-settling defendant for contribution. However, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the Great Lakes decision was not the applicable approach. 
Instead, the court referred to the holding of McDermott, Inc .  v. AmCfyde, 5 1 1 U.S. 202 
( 1 994), whereby the proportionate share approach applied. 
According to the proportionate share approach, when a non-settling defendant 
goes to trial and the amount of damages and corresponding liability percentage is 
calculated, the defendant is only responsible for its proportion of damages as determined 
in the trial verdict. The court further held that in settling with the plaintiff, Florida Keys 
assumed the risk of misjudging the amount of damages the court would calculate as its 
share. The Ashmans did not assume any such risk and therefore if the Murphys got 
larger damages from Florida Keys than if they had gone to trial, such discrepancy does 
not provide the Ashmans with less potential damages liability. As applied to Florida 
Keys ' claim for contribution against the Ashmans, the court held that the decision in 
Jovovich v. Desco Marine, Inc. , 809 F.2d 1 529, 1 53 1  ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 987) is binding and 
therefore Florida Keys must pay the damages as settled and cannot sue the non-settling 
Ashmans for contribution of any portion of those damages. 
The remaining issue on appeal by Florida Keys was the dismissal without 
prejudice of  the Ashmans' suit. Here, the Court of Appeals held that upon the granting of 
the Ashmans summary judgment motion against Florida Keys' contribution claim, the 
court had the ability to dismiss the counterclaim filed by the Ashmans. The court relied 
upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure § 3 1  (a), whereby Florida Keys ' filing of a third-
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party counterclaim against the Ashmans placed the Ashrnans' maritime tort claim within 
the court's jurisdiction as a compulsory counterclaim because the claim arose under the 
same occurrence or transaction. Therefore, overall the court affirmed the holding of the 
District Court. 
Tara Beglin 
Class of 2005 
EXCULPATORY CLAUSE ABSOLVING PARTY 
FROM ITS OWN NEGL IGENCE H ELD VALID 
An exculpatory agreement that shifted the risk of loss to the boat owner and 
released the Yacht Club from all liability, including that liability arising from its 
own negligence will be held valid where the terms of the agreement are clearly and 
uneq uivocally defined. 
Sander v. Alexander Richardson Invs. 
United States Court of Appeals For The Eighth Circui t  
334 F .3d 7 1 2  
(Decided J uly 1 ,  2003) 
Appelles filed a negligence claim against the appellant, the Yacht Club of St. 
Louis ("Yacht Club") after i ts boats was destroyed in a fire at the club. The Yacht Club 
argued that the exculpatory clause in the boat owners' slip rental agreement released it  
from liability even if it  was due to the Yacht Club's own negligence. The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted recovery to the boat owners. 
On Appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed. 
Ronald and Martha Jessup owned a houseboat that was kept at the Yacht Club 
marina. Mr. Jessup noticed a fuel leak near the engine fuel pump and requested the 
Yacht Club to assist him in the repairs. The Yacht Club then referred Mr. Jessup to Mr. 
Shulte a maintenance worker for the Yacht Club who i nstalled a new fuel pump. Three 
days later Mr. Jessup started the engine; shortly after he heard an explosion and watched 
as flames engulfed the hatch area where the engines were located. F ire engulfed the boat 
and then spread to other docks in the marina destroying the appelle's boats. 
Following the fire, the Jessups brought an action for declaratory j udgment in 
district court seeking to exonerate or limit their liability for all claims arising from the 
incident. Each of the boat owners filed claims against both Jessups and the Yacht Club, 
while the Yacht Club and the Jessups filed claims against each other. The claims against 
the Yacht Club were based on the theory that Mr. Shutle negligently installed the fuel 
pump which caused the fire, and that the Yacht Club was liable for assuring that Mr. 
Shulte was quali fi ed to perfonn the repair, when in fact he was not. 
The Yacht Club defended against the boat owners by asserting that an exculpatory 
clause printed on the back of each boat owner's slip agreement exonerated it from any 
liability for damages caused by the fire. 
In reversing the district cou11's decision, the Court of Appeals discussed four 
main issues ( I )  whether the exculpatory clause is valid, (2) whether the exculpatory 
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